When Stackelberg and Cournot Equilibria Coincide by Luca Colombo & Paola Labrecciosa
When Stackelberg and Cournot Equilibria
Coincide∗
Luca Colombo†
Trinity College Dublin and University of Bologna
Paola Labrecciosa‡
Trinity College Dublin and University of Bologna
February 25, 2004
Abstract
We compare two-stage Stackelberg with Cournot equilibrium under the as-
sumption of quantity competition and homogeneous good. We show that, when
the curvature of the inverse market demand equals the total number of ﬁrms
in the industry, the outcome of the two games coincides.
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In this note, we investigate the relationship between two-stage Stackelberg and
Cournot equilibria under the assumption of quantity competition and homogeneous
good. We show that, when the inverse market demand is convex, the outcome of
the two games may coincide. This occurs when the curvature of the inverse market
demand equals the total number of ﬁrms in the industry.
Consider a scenario where multiple leaders choose outputs simultaneously and
independently at ﬁrst and multiple followers choose outputs simultaneously and in-
dependently later, given the leaders‘ total output. The set of players (ﬁrms) is
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1P = F ∪ S,w h e r eF is the set of ﬁrst movers and S is the set of second movers.
There are NF ≥ 1 leaders and NS ≥ 1 followers, with N = NF + NS denoting the
total number of ﬁrms in the industry. The inverse demand for a homogeneous prod-
uct is deﬁned by p : R+ → R+. For every industry output Q ∈ R+ this function





j=1 qj,w i t hi ∈ F and j ∈ S,w h e r eqi and qj are the quantities
produced by the generic leader and the generic follower, respectively. Each ﬁrm has
t h es a m ec o s tf u n c t i o n ,d e ﬁned by c : R+ → R+, satisfying cp > 0.
We solve the game by backward induction, considering ﬁrst the follower j‘s prob-
lem. This, under the Cournot-Nash assumption, consists in setting the proﬁtm a x -
imizing quantity taking as given the quantities of the rivals. First order condition
writes (assuming an inner solution exists):
p
pqj + p − c
p =0 , ∀j ∈ S (1)





pp ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ S (2)




, ∀j ∈ S (3)
where γ = −Q(ppp/pp) is the curvature of the inverse market demand and sj = qj/Q
is the market share of a generic follower.
The leader i‘s program consists in maximizing its proﬁts, πi, under the constraint
given by (1). The Lagrangian function writes:
Li = πi − λ
¡
p
pqj + p − c
p¢
, ∀i ∈ F (4)
First order conditions are:

     
     
∂Li
∂qi
=0⇒ ppqi + p − cp − λ(pppqj + pp)=0
∂L1
∂qj
=0⇒ ppqi − λ(pppqj +2 pp − cpp)=0
∂L1
∂λ
=0⇒ ppqj + p − cp =0
(5)
which, given the concavity assumptions, are also suﬃcient. By applying the condi-
tion of symmetry among followers and among leaders, and the deﬁnition of industry
output, we get: 
     
     
















+ p − cp =0
(6)
































where ε = −Q(pp/p) is the elasticity of the inverse market demand w.r.t. industry









where L =( p − c)/p is the Lerner Index (or price-cost margin). Since in the sym-
metric Cournot game ε = NL , we can write:
Proposition 1 When γ = N Stackelberg and Cournot equilibria coincide.
Example In order to illustrate our result, let us provide a simple example with
constant elasticity and curvature of the inverse market demand and constant returns
to scale. It is worth noting that these assumptions are not required for our proposition
to hold.





with pp = −1/Q2 < 0; ppp =2 /Q3 > 0, ε =1 , γ =2 . Assume N =2and cp =1 .T h e
follower‘s reaction function turns out to be:
qj (qi)=
√
qi − qi (11)
Accordingly, the leader has to maximize the following Lagrangian:
Li = πi − λ(
√
qi − qi − qj) (12)
First order conditions write:

          



































qi + qi + qj =0
(13)









It is straightforward to verify that Stackelberg and Cournot equilibria coincide. Graph-
ically:











The equivalence between Stackelberg and Cournot equilibria is due to the fact
that the point where the isoproﬁtc u r v eo fﬁrm i (the thick line) is tangent to the
reaction function of ﬁrm j, Rj (qi), exactly coincides with the point where the reaction
function of ﬁrm j intersects the 45 degree line.
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